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Merger waves in vertically related industries
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Abstract
This article studies merger waves in the vertically related industries where firms
can engage in both vertical and horizontal mergers. All firms may remain inde-
pendent. But when mergers do take place, they always come in waves which is
either vertical or horizontal depending on the relative benefits of eliminating dou-
ble markup and eliminating horizontal competition. Meanwhile, merger waves may
happen with or without fundamental changes.
Keywords: merger wave, horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, st stable market
structure
JEL Code: L13, L42, D43
1 Introduction
It has been well documented that mergers come in waves, clustering in time and by
industries. Some merger waves are horizontal, consisting mainly of mergers between
competing firms in the same industry, while some other waves are vertical, consisting
mainly of mergers between suppliers and customers across vertically related industries.
For example, the first great merger wave in the U.S. (1893-1904) is horizontal. Con-
solidation between competitors generated corporate giants in the steel, telephone, oil,
mining, railroad and other major manufacturing and transportation industries. The sec-
ond great merger wave (1919-1929), by contrast, is vertical. Ford and General Motors
emerged as the major automobile manufacturers through vertical integration, acquiring
every business along the supply chain from iron and coal mines, railroads and ore boats,
steel mills, body and assembly all the way to finished vehicles. More recently, in Febru-
ary 2011 Nokia and Microsoft announced a comprehensive plan to ally (vertically) in the
Smart phone area in response to the success of Apple’s iPhone. Several months later,
Google acquired Motorola Mobility in a similar move.
Furthermore, the horizontal merger waves can happen parallel in the vertically related
industries. And these two kinds of merger waves, horizontal and vertical, can switch
sometimes. For example, a series of mergers in the US pharmaceutical industry occurred
in 2007 to counter the increased power in the downstream health care industry, where
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consolidation had been taking place. Semiconductor companies used to be vertically
integrated. With rising costs and changing cost structure, economies of scale became
more important, and firms started to disintegrate vertically and merge horizontally.
These examples highlight the need to study horizontal and vertical mergers together,
as a merger will alter the incentives of other mergers, and the impacts are likely to
be diﬀerent depending on whether the mergers are vertical or horizontal. Given the
empirical observation that mergers occur in waves and that a wave can be either vertical
or horizontal, the following questions immediately emerge: Why do mergers occur in
waves? What causes a merger wave to take place? And what determines the wave to be
vertical or horizontal? When will these two kinds of merger waves switch? There have
been some economic studies on horizontal merger waves in the same industries and a few
on vertical merger waves, but virtually none put the two together. This research takes a
novel approach by studying mergers in an economy with vertically related industries and
is therefore uniquely positioned in addressing last two questions. In doing so, however,
the analysis has also shed new lights to answering the first two questions.
A simple model is hitherto constructed which contains two vertically related in-
dustries, each consisting of two firms that may engage in both horizontal and vertical
mergers. Although merger decisions are made simultaneously, the equilibrium concept
is defined such that a firm considers “responses” from other firms when contemplating a
merger. As a result, the interaction between mergers becomes crucial in determining the
equilibrium market structure. Merger waves will be analyzed as an equilibrium outcome
with multiple mergers, which means all firms’ merger incentives must be considered col-
lectively. Furthermore, to explain why a merger wave takes place at a particular time
instead of earlier, we must be able to justify the original situation, i.e., all firms remain-
ing independent, as an equilibrium, too. That is, a merger wave must be endogenized,
representing a change from one equilibrium to another. Comparison of the conditions
between the two equilibria will help answer the question of what triggers a merger wave.
The model demonstrates that indeed mergers occur in waves: In any equilibrium
where a merger takes place, it must be accompanied by a second merger. And an
equilibrium may consist of two mergers, but it may also consist of no mergers, i.e.,
all four firms remain independent even though any individual merger would have been
profitable. A merger is profitable only when the other two firms’ configuration is fixed,
i.e., they remain independent. If these firms also merge, however, the first pair will be
hurt so much that they prefer the original situation in which no firms merge. It is this
concern that prevents any firm from carrying out a merger.
Therefore, no-merger and merger wave can both be equilibria, under either diﬀerent
or the same conditions. A merger wave can consequently be endogenized so that the
economy changes from one equilibrium in which no firm merges, to another equilibrium
in which all firms merge. Such endogenization further points to two potential triggers of
merger waves: Equilibrium may change because the underlying conditions have changed,
or because it is a switch between multiple equilibria without any change in the fundamen-
tals. The first trigger corresponds to an economic shock that changes the cost, demand,
regulation or trading opportunities. Such a trigger is tangible. By contrast, the sec-
ond trigger is intangible, corresponding to something trivia or totally unrelated to the
underlying economic conditions, such as rumor, change in mood or expectation.
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Whether a merger wave is vertical or horizontal depends on the relative benefits of
these two mergers. Vertical mergers remove double markup but intensify downstream
competition. Horizontal mergers eliminate horizontal competition but exacerbate the
double markup problem. Whether a merger wave is vertical or horizontal depends on
the relative benefits of eliminating double markup on the one hand and eliminating
horizontal competition on the other. The two merger waves can switch to each other
due to either the tangible trigger or the intangible trigger.
It is now well known that mergers tend to occur in waves at both the economy and
the industry levels, which is usually explained by economic shocks at the respective
levels (Andrade et al, 2001; Andrade and Staﬀord, 2004; Harford, 2005; Mitchell and
Mulherin, 1996). In the industrial organization literature, there are only a few theoretical
researches on merger waves (Fauli-Oller, 2000; Qiu and Zhou, 2007). However, they all
focus on the horizontal merger waves in the same industry. Qiu and Zhou (2007) and
Toxvaerd (2008) both explained horizontal merger waves by strategic complementarity
between horizontal mergers, where the complementarity arises because a merger raises
other firms’ profits in the first case, and reduces the availability of potential targets in
the second case. These two papers also attributed merger waves to economic shocks that
change a merger’s profitability. While sharing the same focus on multiple mergers and
the attempt to endogenize merger waves, this paper is broader in its setting with both
horizontal and vertical mergers, and richer in its finding of both tangible and intangible
triggers of merger waves.
Bonanno and Vickers (1988) and Lin (1988) have demonstrated that vertical dis-
integration can be an equilibrium because it dampens downstream competition. They
obtained vertical disintegration by assuming away double markup, which is driving ver-
tical integration in our model. Furthermore, unlike their setting in which the only alter-
native to vertical integration is no-merger, firms in our model have additional options
of horizontal mergers. Like the present paper, Colangelo (1995) studied the interaction
between horizontal and vertical mergers in vertically related industries. While his main
finding is that vertical mergers tend to preempt horizontal ones, we are more interested
in merger waves, focusing in particular on justifying no-merger as an equilibrium and
thereby endogenizing merger waves.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and analyzes the main model.
Section 3 generalizes the main model to five diﬀerent variations. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Consider two vertically related industries, the upstream and the downstream. The up-
stream industry consists of two identical firms A and B, and the downstream industry
also consists of two identical firms 1 and 2. A homogeneous input is produced by the
upstream firms at constant marginal cost c and sold through arm’s length transaction
to the downstream firms, which then transform it into a homogeneous final product at
zero extra cost on a one-for-one basis. Firms compete à la Cournot in both industries.
Each downstream firm regards the input price, denoted as t, as given and chooses its
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output facing the demand for the final product, p = α−Q, where Q is the total output
produced by the downstream firms. The downstream Cournot equilibrium will give rise
to Q as a function of t, which is then inverted to generate the inverse demand for the
input, i.e., t as a function of Q. Facing this derived demand, the upstream firms engage
in their Cournot competition.
Firms play a two-stage merger game. In stage one, each firm chooses simultaneously a
merger partner. A firm can commit to independence by choosing itself as the partner. A
merger can be either horizontal (between two downstream firms or two upstream firms)
or vertical (between a downstream firm and an upstream firm), and it takes place if and
only if two firms choose each other as the partner. A merged entity is not allowed to
participate in any further mergers. The merger decisions result in some market structure,
referred to as a configuration, which is publicly known.
Then the game proceeds to stage two. Given the realized market configuration, all
remaining firms, merged or non-merged, compete a la Cournot or choose their quan-
tities in order to maximize their payoﬀs. After that, within a merged entity, the two
partners share the merger surplus equally. The merger surplus is calculated assuming
fixed configuration among the other firms. For example, a merger between firms A and
1 in N ≡ {A,B; 1, 2} leads to S ≡ {B;A1, 2}, so πSA = πNA + 12
¡
πSA1 − πNA − πN1
¢
and
πS1 = π
N
1 +
1
2
¡
πSA1 − πNA − πN1
¢
, where A1 denotes the entity resulting from a merger
between firms A and 1, and πXi is firm i’s payoﬀ in configuration X with i ∈ X.
We look for stable market configurations. A configuration is stable if neither any
individual firm nor any pair of firms have any profitable deviation. A deviation is prof-
itable if all deviators are better oﬀ (strictly for at least one) for any possible configuration
among the other firms.
Since our merger game essentially belongs to one-to-one matching games, following
the matching literature (for example, Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), we check both the
unilateral deviation by a single firm and the collective deviation by a pair of firms. More
precisely, since a merger involves two firms, the unilateral deviation alone is not enough
to address merger issues. The collective deviation must also be considered, as deviating
into a new merger requires the coordination of two firms changing their strategies simul-
taneously. Furthermore, since the merged or non-merged firms will compete or interact
with each other, our merger game is a one-to-one matching with externalities. Follow-
ing Sasaki and Toda (1996), our equilibrium concept requires that a deviation must be
profitable under all possible configurations of the other firms. Such a requirement is ob-
viously suﬃcient to justify the deviation. Meanwhile, It turns out that the requirement
is just strong enough to make the set of stable configurations non-empty and small.1
2.2 Analysis
The game is solved by backward induction. Suppose that at the beginning of stage two,
there are v vertically integrated firms, u upstream firms, and d downstream firms in
the realized market configuration. A vertically integrated firm participates only in the
downstream competition, and it diﬀers from an independent downstream firm in that its
1For more details, please refer to Sasaki and Toda (1996), who have proved the existence of the
equilibrium in one-to-one matching with externalities.
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input is procured at cost c rather than the market price t.2
In the downstream competition, a vertically integrated firm chooses qv to maximize
πv ≡ (α − Q − c)qv, which leads to the first-order condition α − qv − Q = c, where
Q = vqv + dqd (using symmetry), so
α− (v + 1)qv − dqd = c.
Likewise, the first-order condition for a downstream firm is α− qd −Q = t, or
α− (d+ 1)qd − vqv = t.
These two equations lead to
qv =
α− (d+ 1)c+ dt
d+ v + 1
and qd =
α− (v + 1)t+ vc
d+ v + 1
.
The demand for the input for independent upstream firms is therefore
Qi ≡ dqd =
d[α+ vc− (v + 1)t]
d+ v + 1
,
or
t =
α+ vc
v + 1
− d+ v + 1
d(v + 1)
Qi,
where Qi ≡ dqd ≡ uqu is the total quantity by the independent upstream or downstream
firms. Facing this derived demand, an upstream firm will choose qu to maximize πu ≡h
α+vc
v+1 −
d+v+1
d(v+1)Qi − c
i
qu. The Cournot equilibrium is then given by
qu =
d(α− c)
(u+ 1)(d+ v + 1)
.
Consequently,
qd =
u(α− c)
(u+ 1)(d+ v + 1)
, qv =
[d+ (u+ 1)(v + 1)](α− c)
(u+ 1)(v + 1)(d+ v + 1)
,
and Q =
[(u+ 1)(v + 1)(d+ v)− d](α− c)
(u+ 1)(v + 1)(d+ v + 1)
.
It is clear that all profits are proportional to (α − c)2, so we can normalize α − c ≡ 1
without losing any generality. Then, the profits of the three types of the firms are:
πv(v, u, d) =
[d+ (u+ 1)(v + 1)]2
(u+ 1)2(v + 1)2(d+ v + 1)2
,
πu(v, u, d) =
d
(u+ 1)2(v + 1)(d+ v + 1)
,
πd(v, u, d) =
u2
(u+ 1)2(d+ v + 1)2
.
2As argued by Salinger (1988), a vertically integrated entity will withdraw from the upstream
competition–it neither buys the input from other upstream firms nor sells it to other downstream
firms.
Furthermore, given our quantity competition environment, the commitment issue is not as serious as
the price competition model (Hart and Tirole, 1990).
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Now move back to stage one. There are six possible market configurations as listed in
Table 1. Firms’ payoﬀs can be calculated using the formula derived above. For example,
in S1 ≡ {A,B; 1, 2}, v = 0, u = 2, d = 2. As specified earlier, each merged entity divides
the merger surplus/deficit equally between the two partners.
Table 1 Payoﬀs in the six configurations3
Configuration πA πB π1 π2 Total profit
S1 ≡ {A,B; 1, 2} 74 74 49.4 49.4 247
S2 ≡ {AB; 12} 62.5 62.5 31 31 188
S3 ≡ {A1, B2} 62.5 62.5 48.6 48.6 222
S4 ≡ {B;A1, 2} 99 42 74.5 28 243
S5 ≡ {AB; 1, 2} 83 83 28 28 222
S6 ≡ {A,B; 12} 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.5 222
Proposition 1. Only S1 and S3 are stable.
Proof: S1 is stable. There are three possible deviations, but none of them are profitable:
A+B is unprofitable when 1 and 2 merge; 1 + 2 is unprofitable when A and B merge;
and A+ 1 is unprofitable when B and 2 merge.4
S2 is not stable because A + 1 is a profitable deviation: A is indiﬀerent and 1 is
strictly better oﬀ if B and 2 merge; both A and 1 are strictly better oﬀ if B and 2
remain independent.
S3 is stable. There are three possible deviations (excluding symmetric ones), but
none of them are profitable: A breakup (either unilateral or collective) between B and 2
is unprofitable when A and 1 remain merged; A+B is unprofitable when 1 and 2 merge;
1 + 2 is unprofitable when A and B merge.
S4 is not stable because B + 2 is a profitable (whether A and 1 separate or remain
merged).
S5 is not stable because 1 + 2 is a profitable (whether A and B separate or remain
merged).
S6 is not stable because A + B is a profitable (whether 1 and 2 separate or remain
merged). Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 says that the four firms either remain independent or carry out two
vertical mergers. To understand the intuition, it is useful to summarize the payoﬀs in
Table 1 into the following three profitability ranking:
R1 : An exogenous merger, i.e., fixing the configuration among the remaining two
firms, is always profitable. The reason is because the merger internalizes either the hor-
izontal externality (horizontal competition) or the vertical externality (double markup),
which benefits the merging partners.
R2 : A merger always hurts other firms and consequently a breakup always benefits
other firms. A vertical merger will makes the merged entity more aggressive in the
3The fractions of the payoﬀs are turned into numerical values by multiplying 1000 for ease of com-
parison.
4For convenience, we use i+ j to denote a merger between firms i and j.
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downstream competition by eliminating the double markup, which hurts other firms. A
horizontal merger between duopolists will hurt the other industry by reducing quantities
supplied or demanded.
R3 : S1 Pareto dominates S3 which in turn dominates S2. S3 involves only the hori-
zontal externality, S2 involves only the vertical externality, but S1 has both. Compared
to the single monopoly case (where all four firms merged), the vertical externality will
reduce the quantity produced, while the horizontal externality will increase the quantity
produced. In S1, these two opposite eﬀects will comprise each other, which leads S1
dominates both S2 and S3. But these two opposite eﬀects are not completely cancelled
out since the vertical externality is stronger than the horizontal one here, which let S3
dominate S2.
First, notice that it cannot be stable to have only one merger because the remaining
two independent firms will be better oﬀ by merging. They gain if the originally merged
firm remains merged (R1 ), and will gain even more if the merged firm breaks up (R2 ).
Second, having two horizontal mergers is unstable, as an upstream firm and a downstream
firm would rather merge vertically. Such a deviation is profitable if the other two firms
also merge vertically (R3 ), and is even more profitable if the other two firms do not
merge (R2 ).
That leaves us with two configurations: all firms remain independent (S1) or carry
out two vertical mergers (S3). Both are stable. Consider first the no-merger case. An
exogenous merger would have been profitable (R1 ). However, if the other two firms also
merge, the first merger becomes unprofitable (R3 ). Therefore, no deviation (in the form
of a merger) will be carried out. Next consider the case of two vertical mergers. It is
unprofitable to either break up (if the other merged firm remains merged–R1 ) or have
a horizontal merger (if the other two firms also merge horizontally–R3 ).
2.3 Discussion
Proposition 1 highlights four conclusions that merit discussion. First, mergers occur in
waves. Whenever there is a merger, it must be accompanied by another one. A single
merger can never prevail because it hurts the other two firms so much that a merger
between those two becomes a dominant strategy: Given a merger, the other merger is
profitable whether the first pair dissolves or remains merged.
Second, a merger wave may be vertical or horizontal depending on their relative
benefits. In our 2 by 2 setting, a merger wave may consist of two vertical mergers (S3
or simply 2V) or two horizontal mergers (S2 or 2H), referred to respectively as vertical
and horizontal merger waves.5 As we have mentioned above, the damage or strength of
double markup is greater than that of horizontal competition, and firms end up taking
vertical mergers rather than horizontal ones. Notice that the relative benefits depend on
the model setting. If, for example, the competition is a la Bertrand rather than Cournot,
in which case the merger wave will be horizontal. In the next section, we are going to
explore more about the conditions for a merger wave to be vertical or horizontal.
Third, a merger wave may take place without any fundamental change. Proposition 1
5Here the horizontal wave consists of a horizontal merger in each of the two industries, which is
slightly diﬀerent from the usual meaning of multiple horizontal mergers in the same industry.
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predicts multiple equilibria in this game. The firms may coordinate on S1 and all the four
firms remain independent. However, they may change suddenly from S1 to S3, carrying
out two vertical mergers. Because both are equilibria, shifting from S1 to S3 does not
require any change in the underlying economic conditions such as demand or technology.
The trigger may be something trivial or totally unrelated: mood, expectation, rumor,
etc.
Although 4I and 2V are both equilibria, they are not on an equal footing. Switching
from 4I to 2V is possible or even likely because, if for whatever reason, a pair of firms
expect the other pair will merge, they will surely follow suit. The reverse process of
jumping from 2V to 4I, interpreted as a divestiture wave, is more diﬃcult. If for some
reason a pair breaks up, it is in the best interest of the second pair not to follow. Such
an asymmetry between the two equilibria may explain why in real life, merger waves are
much more common than divestiture waves.
Fourth, a merger wave may not materialize. In particular, S1 or 4I is also an equilib-
rium. When multiple mergers are possible, merger incentives should not be considered
in isolation; the interaction between mergers becomes crucial. Qiu and Zhou (2007) have
shown that in a single industry, a merger raises the profitability of another merger, so an
unprofitable merger may be carried out in anticipation of subsequent mergers. In this
model, the eﬀect of a merger is the opposite: it reduces the profits of other firms. Firms
refrain from mergers for fear of other mergers.
3 Generalization
The results discussed so far are derived from a highly stylized model with symmetric
2×2 firms, constant marginal costs, homogeneous products, linear demand and Cournot
competition. One may wonder whether the conclusions still hold under more general
conditions. In this section we will investigate five variations of the main model by relaxing
its assumptions, one at a time, so that product is diﬀerentiated, the competition is in price
rather than in quantity, the marginal cost is increasing, or the demand is non-linear.6
All conclusions reached in the main model are found to be robust. More importantly,
since the main model is a special case of the variation models, we are able to put the
conclusions in perspective and understand better their meaning, conditions and reasons.
In particular, we will discuss the conditions for vertical and horizontal merger waves,
and identify two types of causes that triggers a merger wave.
3.1 Product diﬀerentiation
Suppose that the final products are diﬀerentiated (the inputs are still homogeneous) so
that the demand for firm i’s product is pi = α−qi−βqj , where i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, and
β ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Furthermore, the competition
in each industry may be in either quantity or price, which gives rise to the following three
combinations: Cournot competition in both industries (Cournot-Cournot); upstream
Cournot competition and downstream Bertrand competition (Cournot-Bertrand); and
6Furthermore, a 3X3 case is analyzed in the appendix.
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Bertrand competition in both industries (Bertrand-Bertrand). All other aspects of the
game remain the same as in the main model. For each of the three cases, a payoﬀ table
similar to Table 1 can be constructed, where each payoﬀ is a function of β only.7
Proposition 2.
(1) In Cournot-Cournot, S1 is stable for β > 0.29 and S3 is stable for any β.
(2) In Cournot-Bertrand, S1 is stable for 0.22 < β < 0.8, S2 is stable for β > 0.66,
and S3 is stable for β < 0.66.
(3) In Bertrand-Bertrand, S3 is stable for β < 0.66 and S2 is for any β.
Proof : See the appendix.
The equilibrium results are summarized in Table 2, which also shows the results from
Proposition 3. The parameter range indicates the condition for a particular configuration
to be stable, and the parenthesis below indicates the profitable deviation that makes the
configuration unstable when the condition is violated. For example, in the Cournot-
Cournot case, S1 is stable for β > 0.29. If β < 0.29, S1 becomes unstable because A+B
is a profitable deviation.
Table 2: Results of Propositions 2 and 3
Cases S1 (4I ) S2 (2H ) S3 (2V )
Cournot-Cournot
β > 0.29
(A+B)
Never
(A+ 1)
Always
Cournot-Bertrand
0.22 < β < 0.80
(A+B) (1 + 2)
β > 0.66
(A+ 1)
β < 0.66
(A+B)
Bertrand-Bertrand
Never
(A+B)
Always
β < 0.66
(A+B)
Increasing mc
γ < 2
(1 + 2)
γ > 2
(A+ 1)
γ < 2
(1 + 2)
General demand Always
σ > 1
(A+ 1)
σ ≤ 1
(A+B)
Note that the market configurations with a single merger (S4, S5 and S6) are still un-
stable. The reason is as what we have discussed in the main model, which will be further
elaborated later. Below we explain why and under what conditions the configurations
with no-merger (S1) and the two merger waves (S2 and S3) are stable.
¥ Cournot-Cournot
The setting is the same as the main model except that the final products are diﬀer-
entiated, so the main model is a special case with β = 1. Greater diﬀerentiation between
the final products weakens the downstream competition. If products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated (β is small), a downstream merger in 4I will not reduce the quantity de-
manded for inputs by much and therefore will do little damage to the upstream firms.
Recall that upstream firms refrain from an otherwise profitable merger for fear of the
negative impact of a downstream merger. If the impact is expected to be small, upstream
firms will merge, and as a result 4I becomes unstable.
7Again α− c can be normalized without losing any generality.
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In the main model when products are homogeneous, 2V preempts 2H. Product dif-
ferentiation will further strengthen the dominance of 2V over 2H because weaker down-
stream competition reduces 2V’s disadvantage (of facing downstream competition) and
2H’s advantage (of mitigating downstream competition). As a result, 2V is always stable
while 2H is never stable for β ∈ [0, 1].
¥ Cournot-Bertrand
When downstream firms compete in price rather than quantity, the downstream
competition is intensified. 4I is stable only if products are modestly diﬀerentiated (in-
termediate β). As in the previous case, when products are highly diﬀerentiated, the
upstream firms do not need to worry about the negative impact of a downstream merger,
so they merge. When products are close substitutes, on the other hand, the downstream
competition is fierce. Downstream firms will merge to avoid this competition.
As explained earlier, product diﬀerentiation favors 2V over 2H, so 2V continues to be
stable when products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (small β). Conversely, when products
are close substitutes (large β), fierce competition in the downstream industry raises the
benefits of horizontal mergers and the drawbacks of vertical mergers, so 2H becomes
stable.
¥ Bertrand-Bertrand
The upstream firms also compete in price now, so the upstream competition is greatly
intensified. In fact it is intensified to the greatest extent as inputs are homogeneous. 4I is
never stable because upstream firms earn zero profits in 4I and they will always attempt
to merge.
As in the Cournot-Bertrand case, when the final products are close substitutes, 2H is
stable; when products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, 2V is stable. In the latter case when
products are very diﬀerentiated, 2H is dominated by 2V, but 2H is still stable. Deviating
in 2H to a vertical merger may hurt the upstream partner because its contribution to,
and hence its profit share within, the vertical merger will be small if the other two firms
do not merge (it will earn zero without its own merger). So 2H is stable for all degrees
of product diﬀerentiation.
Colangelo (1995) has also studied the trade-oﬀ between vertical and horizontal merg-
ers. His game 3 is similar to our Bertrand-Bertrand game except that merger decisions
are made sequentially with exogenous target for the initial acquisition. Despite the diﬀer-
ence in game rules, predictions from the two models are largely consistent: 2H for small
product diﬀerentiation and 2V for large diﬀerentiation. This indicates that our game
rule is able to capture the essence of merger incentives without specifying the details of
the merger process.
3.2 Cost and demand
We now move back to the setting with homogeneous final product and Cournot com-
petition in both industries. In the main model, the cost of input production and the
demand for the final product are both linear: C(q) = cq and p = α − Q. On the cost
side, the model can be generalized to allow increasing marginal cost (mc): C(q) = γq2
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with γ ≥ 0. Note that the main model is a special case of increasing mc with γ = 0.8
On the demand side, it can also become more general in the form of p = α − Qσ with
α > 0 and σ > 0. Again the main model is a special case with σ = 1. Note a peculiar
property of this general demand function: its concavity, defined as p
00(Q)Q
p0(Q) , is constant.
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Proposition 3.
(1) In the increasing marginal cost case with C(q) = γq2, S1 and S3 are stable for
γ < 2, and S2 is stable for γ > 2.
(2) In the more general demand case with p = α−Qσ, S1 is stable for any σ, S2 is
stable for σ > 1, and S3 is stable when σ ≤ 1.
Proof : See the appendix.
The results are summarized in Table 2. Below are the explanations for the stable
configurations.
¥ Increasing marginal cost
Producing the inputs at increasing marginal costs will reduce the upstream competi-
tion.10 When the marginal cost increases fast with quantity (γ is large), 4I is unstable.
This is because an upstream merger in 4I will not raise the input price by much and
therefore will do little damage to downstream firms, who would then like to merge.
An increasing marginal cost favors 2H over 2V. The benefit of a vertical merger comes
from output expansion due to the elimination of double markup. When the marginal
cost of input increases with quantity, expansion is increasingly costly, so the benefits of
vertical mergers decrease. When the marginal cost curve is flat (γ is small), the drop in
the benefits of vertical mergers is small, so 2V continues to dominate 2H, meaning that
2V is stable while 2H is not.
¥ General demand
As before, the equilibrium outcome depends on the relative strength of the vertical
externality and the horizontal externality. On the one hand, when the demand is convex
(σ < 1), the double markup problem is more serious than the horizontal competition.
Therefore, 2V dominates 2H. On the other hand, when the demand is concave (σ > 1),
horizontal externality is more serious so that 2H is stable while 2V is unstable.11 In
4I, the horizontal externality and the vertical externality coexist and they mitigate each
other, and thus 4I is always stable.
8 In the main model, the exact value of c is inconsequential, as all profits are proportional to (α− c)2
and so α− c has been normalized without any loss of generality. We may as well think that c = 0.
9 In fact, p
00(Q)Q
p0(Q) = σ − 1. This function has been used by Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and other
researchers in studying merger incentives and/or vertically related industries.
10 In terms of oligopoly behavior, product homogeneity with increasing marginal costs is mathematically
equivalent to product diﬀerentiation with constant marginal cost (Vives, 1999). In a sense, the increasing
marginal cost considered here introduces diﬀerentiation to the inputs.
11According to Ziss (2005) Lemma 1, if the concavity of the demand for the final product is constant
and equal to σ − 1, the demand for the input is also constant and equal to σ − 1.
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3.3 Discussion
3.3.1 Partial mergers
Out of the six possible configurations for each of the above five cases, partial merger (S4,
S5 and S6) is never stable. The reason is still the two profitability ranking that we have
seen in the main model: an exogenous merger between any two firms is always profitable
(R1 ), while a merger always hurts other firms (R2 ). These two ranking are still valid in
generalized models.
Consider first an upstream horizontal merger. Merging from duopoly into monopoly
should always be profitable. The complication here is the presence of the downstream
industry, which may aﬀect the upstream merger’s profitability. However, the demand
that upstream firms face is derived from the downstream competition. As long as the
downstream configuration is fixed, that demand does not change. Since the profitability
of merging from duopoly into monopoly is unconditional, an upstream merger continues
to be profitable when there is a downstream industry. Because the upstream merger
raises the input price, it hurts downstream firms.
Next consider a downstream horizontal merger. Again it’s a merger from duopoly to
monopoly, and again the complication is the presence of a vertically related industry, the
upstream. In particular, upstream firms may try to share the benefit of the downstream
merger by raising the input price, which will reduce the profitability of the downstream
merger. However, it can be verified that in the main model as well as the five models
considered above, a downstream merger does not change the equilibrium input price.12
As a result, a downstream merger continues to be profitable when there is an upstream
industry. Because the downstream merger reduces quantity demanded for inputs without
changing the input price, it hurts upstream firms.
Finally consider a vertical merger. Because the number of firms in the two industries
are equal, the two merging firms must produce the same quantity without the merger.
Then the merger must be profitable because it enables the merging firms to internalize
the externality generated by double markup. Because the merger makes the merged firm
more competitive in the downstream competition, it hurts other firms.13
12 In the main model, for example, the equilibrium input price is t = c + α−c(u+1)(v+1) , which does not
depend on d. So if there is a downstream merger (i.e., d decreases by 1), the equilibrium input price will
not change. A downstream merger rotates the demand for inputs clockwise around the intercept. This
rotation has two opposite eﬀects on t: For any given t, the quantity demanded is smaller, so t tends to
drop. At the same time, the demand becomes less elastic, so t tends to rise. In the case of linear demand
for the final product, the two forces exactly cancel out each other so the equilibrium input price will not
depend on the number of downstream firms. For non-linear demand, Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and Ziss
(2005) have shown the same invariance as long as the demand has constant concavity, which is satisfied
by the general demand we adopt here.
13A minor exception is when firms compete in prices in both industries (Bertrand-Bertrand). A
vertical merger removes a competitor from the upstream industry and therefore benefits the remaining
independent upstream firm (its profit increases from zero to positive). But this will not aﬀect the
equilibrium results.
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3.3.2 No-merger
As mentioned earlier, in all cases except the Bertrand-Bertrand one, 2V eliminates double
markup but retains horizontal competition, so the firms over-produce from the viewpoint
of their joint profits, i.e., a horizontal externality. By contrast, 2H removes horizontal
competition but has double markup problem, so the firms under-produce, which can be
viewed as a vertical externality. 4I has both externalities, but since the two move in
opposite directions, one mitigates the other, so the firms’ joint profits tend to increase.
Furthermore, If the two opposite eﬀects are more or less balanced, 4I is stable. In the
Bertrand-Bertrand case, however, only horizontal externality exists in 4I. Therefore, 4I
is never stable but 2H is always stable.
The stability of 4I is always threatened by a horizontal merger, not a vertical one. For
a vertical merger to be profitable in 4I, the vertical pair will have to earn more. Because
the two vertical pairs are symmetric, the four firms’ total profits must therefore be higher
in 2V than in 4I, which in general does not hold. By contrast, 4I may be disrupted by
a horizontal merger; all it needs are benefits accruing to one horizontal pair, not both
pairs. This is possible because the two industries are inherently asymmetric and so the
two pairs’ profits may be very diﬀerent.
So it is possible for all four firms to refrain from any merger if the horizontal ex-
ternality and the vertical externality are more or less balanced. When the balance is
disrupted by, say, intensified or weakened competition in one industry, firms will take up
a horizontal merger, and 4I will no longer be stable. Take the Cournot-Bertrand case as
an example: When the final products are close substitutes, the downstream horizontal
competition is strong, so the downstream firms will merge to internalize this externality.
When they are very poor substitutes, but the upstream firms’ competition is strong and
they will merge. As a result, 4I is stable only for moderate diﬀerentiation in the final
products.
3.3.3 Vertical and horizontal merger wave
In most cases except the Bertrand-Bertrand one, 2H and 2V are mutually exclusive: one
is stable whenever the other is unstable, and vice versa. This is because the threat to
the stability of a merger wave is always the other wave. As mentioned earlier, whether
a merger wave is vertical or horizontal depends on the relative benefits of eliminating
double markup on the one hand and eliminating horizontal competition on the other.
Intensified competition in the downstream industry reduces the benefits of vertical
mergers and increases the benefits of downstream horizontal mergers, making it more
likely for 2H to prevail. That is why price (rather than quantity) competition in the
downstream and closer substitutability between final products favor 2H over 2V.
To summarize, a merger wave tends to be vertical when the double markup problem
is more serious, and a wave tends to be horizontal when the horizontal competition is
more serious.
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Figure 1: Stable configurations with the five cases
3.3.4 Causes of merger waves
So far we have been talking about the equilibrium conditions: Sometimes firms refrain
from mergers; sometimes they carry out a series of mergers. The next question is, what
causes firms to merge? A model of endogenous mergers must explain not only why a
merger takes place, but also why it did not take place earlier. In other words, no-merger
and mergers must both be justified as equilibria, possibly under diﬀerent conditions.
And we would like to understand what causes the equilibrium to switch from 4I to 2V
or 2H. The generalized models shed some light on the answers to this question. In all
these models, at any parameter value, there is at most two stable configurations and at
least one. These equilibrium outcomes are demonstrated in Figure 1, where the bullet
points represent the main model’s result as a special case.
For some ranges of the parameters, there is a unique stable configuration, which is
invariably a merger wave, sometimes 2V and sometimes 2H. If the parameter falls into
that range, the merger wave should take place immediately, so the only explanation
why the mergers did not take place earlier is that the parameter was outside the range,
where all firms remaining independent was an equilibrium. Such a change of parameter
value can be interpreted as an economic shock. For example, in Cournot-Cournot, 2V
is the unique equilibrium for β < 0.29, and 4I is an equilibrium (though not unique) for
β > 0.29. If something changes β from a value greater than 0.29 to a value below it,
the market will undergo a wave of vertical mergers. Therefore, greater diﬀerentiation in
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the final products (due to, say, more investment in R&D or advertising) may trigger a
vertical merger wave. Likewise, a more convex demand may also trigger a vertical merger
wave. Similarly, a horizontal merger wave may be triggered by smaller diﬀerentiation
in the final products (Cournot-Bertrand), steeper marginal cost in input production, or
greater concavity of demand.
For some other ranges of the parameters, there are exactly two equilibria and, in most
cases, one is 4I and the other is either 2V or 2H. When that is the case, it is possible for
a merger wave to take place without any change in the underlying economic conditions,
as we have seen in the main model. For example, this may happen for a vertical merger
wave when products are close substitutes (Cournot-Cournot), marginal cost rises slowly,
or the demand is convex, and for a horizontal merger wave when product diﬀerentiation
is moderate (Cournot-Bertrand) or the demand is concave.
So there are two types of causes that may trigger a merger wave, one is tangible
and the other is not. As explained above, endogenous mergers take place when the
economy switches from one equilibrium in which all firms remain independent to another
equilibrium in which all firms merge.14 This change of equilibrium can be brought in two
ways. The first is a change in the underlying economic conditions, which is interpreted
as an economic shock. This is a tangible trigger for merger waves. The second is a shift
between multiple equilibria without any change in the underlying economic conditions.
This is an intangible trigger, corresponding to rumors, or a sudden change in expectation
or mood.
Qiu and Zhou (2007, 2010) have found that horizontal merger waves can be caused
by demand or cost shocks. The present work goes beyond that. The setting is broader
to encompass both horizontal and vertical mergers. The finding is richer: a merger wave
can be triggered by not only tangible reasons such as economic shocks, but also intangible
reasons such as mood or expectation. In real life, both types of causes can be observed:
Sometimes a clear trigger can be identified in the form of a sudden or gradual change in
the underlying economic conditions such as demand, technology, regulation, or opening
to international trade, but sometimes a series of mergers may take place without any
obvious change in the fundamentals.
4 Conclusion
We have studied endogenous market structure in vertically related industries where firms
can engage in both vertical and horizontal mergers. Because of concerns for subsequent
mergers, all firms may remain independent even though any individual merger would
have been profitable. When mergers do take place, they always occur together, forming
a merger wave that is either vertical or horizontal depending on the relative damage of
double markup and horizontal competition. By endogenizing merger waves as a change
from one equilibrium in which no firm merges, to another equilibrium in which all firms
merge, we are able to identify two triggers for a merger wave, a tangible one corresponding
to a change in the underlying economic conditions, and an intangible one that shifts the
14Note that in Bertrand-Bertrand, 2V and 2H can switch to each other, which can explain the semi-
conductor industry case mentioned in the first paragraph of this article
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economy between multiple equilibria without any change in the fundamentals.
The research demonstrates the importance of interactions between mergers and the
connection, or the lack of it, between merger waves and the underlying economic condi-
tions. Mergers are carried out for competition purposes: In the absence of merger-specific
cost or benefit and the antitrust authority, firms merge in order to reduce competition
and/or gain competitive advantage over competitors or upstream/downstream firms.
More broadly, a merger may have both a competition eﬀect and a merger-specific eﬀect
such as cost savings or synergies. By focusing on the first eﬀect, this research helps
us understand as a first step how interaction between mergers shapes the equilibrium
market structure, and how the structure may change with or without any change in
the underlying economic conditions. Such understanding and analytical framework are
useful in understanding intuitions where the second eﬀect is also present . For example,
cost or demand changes that are peculiar to a merger may precipitate it, which will
then trigger a dramatic change in the overall market structure involving several related
industries. The anticipation of subsequent changes in market structure will in turn alter
the incentive of the first merger. That is, the second eﬀect can be added to the analytical
framework, and the interaction between the two eﬀects must be analyzed simultaneously.
The model adopts the simplest possible setting with two upstream and two down-
stream firms, or 2×2. In addition to simplicity, it provides a natural setting where an
exogenous merger always benefits the merging firms and hurts non-merging firms. These
eﬀects conform to common understanding of what a merger means and are robust re-
gardless of where firms compete in price or quantity. So firms do not suﬀer from “merger
paradox” in which a merger always hurts merging firms and benefits non-merging firms
in the same industry (Salant et al, 1983). Needless to say, this simplistic setting has its
drawbacks. When a horizontal merger takes place, there is no possibility for a vertical
merger. So horizontal and vertical merger waves are mutually exclusive, and there is
always a tradeoﬀ: a benefit is accompanied by a drawback. Also, merging from duopoly
into monopoly is special. Strange as it may appear, the merger paradox captures the
important competition eﬀect of mergers within an industry (in the absence of merger-
specific cost savings) and therefore cannot be ignored. So it is important to go beyond
the 2×2 setting.
In the appendix, we analyzed the 3×3 setting and showed that there are two equi-
libria, one in which all firms remain independent and the other in which three vertical
mergers take place. Similar patterns have been found in settings of 3×4, 4×3 and 4×4,
so Proposition 1 is indeed robust to the number of firms in either industry. A technical
diﬃculty when there are more than two firms in an industry is that the equilibrium set
tends to be large that contains some unreasonable market structures, so the equilibrium
concept has to be modified slightly. More work needs to be done along this direction.
We have defined a special equilibrium concept in this model because existing con-
cepts such as core or stable equilibrium are ill suited to study the questions at hand. Our
equilibrium concept has two key components: simultaneous move (in terms of merger
decisions) and pessimistic view (deviators worry about the worst configuration among
the remaining firms). A sequential game has the advantage of generating strategic in-
centive for mergers and may therefore account as another explanation for merger waves
(Qiu and Zhou, 2007). But the disadvantage is that the equilibrium will be sensitive
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to the order of move and other details of the game setting, which a researcher has no
compelling reason or suﬃcient information to specify exogenously. For example, Colan-
gelo’s (1995) sequential game leads to very diﬀerent predictions of the equilibrium market
structure depending on which firm is the first acquisition target, which is exogenously
given. Pessimistic view has been adopted in the coalition formation literature as one of
several possible refinements for deviations (the α game versus the γ game). The essence
is that firms are allowed to “respond” to a deviation without specifying why or how
they do so. The responses are important because a merger’s profitability depends on
the configuration among non-merging firms, and in real life when merger decisions are
made sequentially, merging firms will look ahead and anticipate the likely configuration
among the remaining firms. Therefore, the pessimistic view is particularly useful when
adopted in combination with simultaneous move. The equilibrium concept thus defined
is able to capture the essential interaction between mergers without specifying how the
interaction is carried out. That is, the pessimistic view mitigates the disadvantage of
simultaneous games.
Finally, people may have concerns about the sharing rule and the assumption that
the two industries do business by arm’s length transaction. We have assumed that
merging firms split the merger surplus equally fixing the configuration among remaining
firms, which seems to contradict our equilibrium concept where the configuration is
variable when firms contemplate deviations. However, if configurations are allowed to
vary in calculating profit sharing, the profits will be ill defined because there are multiple
configurations. Arm’s length transaction may seem problematic when an industry has
only one firm. But what is really needed is double markup and that fact that input price
should be aﬀected (in principle) by the market structure. Such a setting is relevant in at
least some situations. An alternative to arm’s length transaction may be two-part tariﬀ.
But our Bertrand-Bertrand game removes double markup and may therefore capture
what will happen when two-part tariﬀ is assumed.
5 Appendix
Procedures of proving Propositions 2 and 3
The procedures are the following. In each case, we construct the payoﬀ table similar
to Table 1 (the tables are omitted and are available up request). Each payoﬀ will be a
function containing relevant parameters. It turns out that α and c can be normalized
without any loss of generality. Then each payoﬀ will depend on only one parameter.
Given the payoﬀs, we check the stability of each configuration. For a configuration
to be stable, we have to check every possible deviation, but for any given deviation, it
only needs to be unprofitable for one firm (does not have to be for both firms). For
a configuration to be unstable, we only need to find one profitable deviation; if it is a
collective deviation, the deviation has to be profitable for both firms.
For S1 = {A,B; 1, 2} to be stable: (i) A + B is unprofitable: πS1A > min{πS2A , πS5A }.
(ii) 1 + 2 is unprofitable: πS11 > min{πS21 , πS61 }. (iii) A + 1 is unprofitable: πS1i >
min{πS3i , πS4i } for i = A or 1.
For S2 = {AB; 12} to be stable: (i) BreakingAB is unprofitable: πS2A > min{πS1A , πS6A }.
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(ii) Breaking 12 is unprofitable: πS21 > min{πS11 , πS51 }. (iii) A + 1 is unprofitable:
πS2i > min{πS3i , πS4i } for i = A or 1.
For S3 = {A1, B2} to be stable: (i) Breaking B2 is unprofitable: πS3i > min{πS1i , πS4i }
for i = B and 2. (ii) A+B is unprofitable: πS3A > min{πS2A , πS5A }. (iii) 1+2 is unprofitable:
πS31 > min{πS21 , πS61 }.
For S4 = {B;A1, 2} to be unstable, we only need one of following cases holds: (i)
B + 2 is profitable: πS4i < min{πS3i , πS4j } for i = B, 2 and j = A, 1. (ii) A + B is
profitable: πS4A < min{πS2A , πS5A }. (iii) 1 + 2 is profitable: πS41 < min{πS21 , πS61 }. (iv)
Breaking A1 is profitable: πS4i < min{πS1i , πS4j } for i = A, 1 and j = B, 2. (v) A + 2
is profitable: πS4i < min{πS3i , πS4j } for i = A, 2 and j = A, 1. (vi) B + 1 is profitable:
πS4i < min{πS3i , πS4j } for i = B, 1 and j = A, 1.
For S5 = {AB; 1, 2} to be unstable: 1 + 2 is profitable: πS51 < min{πS21 , πS61 }.
For S6 = {A,B; 12} to be unstable: A+B is profitable: πS6A < min{πS2A , πS5A }.Q.E.D.
The 3×3 case
Suppose there are three identical firms, namely A,B,C, in the upstream industry,
and three identical firms, namely 1, 2, 3, in the down stream industry. Other things
remain unchanged as the main model.
There are 10 possible market configurations as shown in the following table.
Configurations πA πB πC π1 π2 π3 Total profit
S1 = {A,B,C; 1, 2, 3} 47 47 47 35 35 35 246
S2 = {A1, B2, C3} 34 34 34 28.5 28.5 28.5 187.5
S3 = {C;A1, B2, 3} 42.5 42.5 21 42.5 42.5 15.5 206.5
S4 = {B,C;A1, 2, 3} 61.5 28 28 49.5 28 28 222
S5 = {BC;A1, 23} 99 21 21 74.5 14 14 243
S6 = {BC;A1, 2, 3} 98 31 31 42.5 15.5 15.5 234.5
S7 = {B,C;A1, 23} 65 18.5 18.5 86 24.5 24.5 237.5
S8 = {A,BC; 1, 23} 74 37 37 49.5 25 25 247
S9 = {A,BC; 1, 2, 3} 83.5 41.5 41.5 28 28 28 250
S10 = {A,B,C; 1, 23} 41.5 41.5 41.5 62.5 31 31 250
Proposition 4. In the three by three case, S1 and S2 are stable.
Proposition 4 says that all firms will either remain independent or carry out three
vertical mergers, which is consistent with the result of the main model.
Proof: S1 is stable. First, there is no any profitable unilateral deviation since all of
the firms remain independent. Second, there is no any profitable collective deviation.
To see this, there are three possible collective deviations: B + C, 2 + 3,and A + 1 (due
to symmetry, we don’t consider other identical collective deviations). B + C is not a
profitable deviation since both firms B and C are worse oﬀ in S5. 2+3 is not a profitable
deviation since both firms are worse oﬀ in S5. A+1 is not a profitable deviation as well
because both A and 1 are worse oﬀ under S2.
S2 is stable. First, there is no any profitable unilateral deviation since no any firm
wants to break up with its merger partner. To see this, suppose C3 breaks up. But both
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C and 3 are worse oﬀ in S3 compared to S2. Second, there is no any profitable collective
deviation. To see this, there are two possible collective deviations: B + C and 2 + 3.
B + C is not profitable since both of them are worse oﬀ in S6 compared to S3. 2 + 3 is
not profitable either since both of them are worse oﬀ in S7 compared to S3.
Note that S3 is not stable since C +3 is a profitable deviation. S4, S5, S6 and S7 are
not stable since B + 2 is a profitable deviation for all of them. S8, S9 and S10 are stable
using our criterion for stability, but they are not reasonable equilibria: in S8, BC prefers
to break up; in S9, BC also prefers to break up; in S10, 23 prefers to break up. Those
firms won’t choose to merge horizontally at the first place due to the merger paradox
argument (Salant et al., 1983). Q.E.D.
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